Touchstone 2 Teacher's Book Free 126
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specificity of the statutory limitation is required where, as here, the legislation imposes criminal penalties in an area permeated by First Amendment interests. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 415 U. S. 573 (1974); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S. 278, 368 U. S. 287-288 (1961); Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 361 U. S. 151 (1959). [Footnote 48] The test is whether the language of § 608(e)(1) affords the "[p]recision of regulation [that] must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 371 U. S. 438.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 370 U. S. 432 (1962) (footnote omitted). See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 330 U. S. 8-15 (1947). But the central purpose of the Speech and Press Clauses was to assure a society in which "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" public debate concerning matters of public interest would thrive, for only in such a society can a healthy representative democracy flourish. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 376 U. S. 270 (1964). Legislation to enhance these First Amendment values is the rule, not the exception. Our statute books are replete with laws providing financial assistance to the exercise of free speech, such as aid to public broadcasting and other forms of educational media, 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-399, and preferential postal rates and antitrust exemptions for newspapers, 39 CFR § 132.2 (1975); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804. 2b1af7f3a8